Why did Jefferson call the election of 1800 a peaceful Revolution text to speech?
Show Students also viewedChapter 1215 terms Chapter 1424 terms Chapter 12 History60 terms U.S. History Ch 1319 terms Sets found in the same folderhistory19 terms Chapter 1424 terms
8 th grade US History Chapter 11 test review25 terms Whisky Rebellion8 terms Other sets by this creatorCell Processes Chapter 325 terms Chapter 21 The Nervous System12 terms Tectonic Plates and Mountains (B chapter 2)11 terms Cracked Crust8 terms Verified questionshistory of the americas In your opinion, why were the Embargo Act and the Non-Intercourse Act unsuccessful? Verified answer
history of the americas List the effects of Columbus's voyages. Which effects were negative and which were positive? Verified answer
history of the americas How did the events at Lexington and Concord change the conflict between Great Britain and the colonies? Verified answer
history of the americas Do you think the Transportation Revolution played a role in deforestation ? Explain. Verified answer Recommended textbook solutions
American Anthem1st EditionDeborah Gray White, Edward L. Ayers, Jesús F. de la Teja, Robert D. Schulzinger 2,629 solutions
Social Studies American History: Reconstruction to the Present Guided Reading Workbook1st EditionHOUGHTON MIFFLIN HARCOURT 1,031 solutions Descubramos Nuestro Pasado: Historia de Estados Unidos los Primeros Años1st EditionMcGraw-Hill 496 solutions
United States History: Modern America1st EditionAlan Taylor, Emma J. Lapsansky-Werner, Peter B. Levy, Randy Roberts 711 solutions Other Quizlet setsFinal Exam CS2400 Study Guide21 terms Chapter 728 terms UTB, Q and A17 terms anatomy 1 & 2 test89 terms
The Election of 1800-1801 Table of Contents Introduction Rejoice, Columbia's son rejoice Years later, Adams contended to Jefferson that Jefferson did not understand the Federalists' fears of civic disorder and revolution. Adams wrote his former opponent in 1813: "You never felt the terrorism of Shays's Rebellion in Massachusetts. I believe you never felt the terrorism of Gallatin's Insurrection in Pennsylvania. … You certainly never felt the terrorism excited by Genet in 1793, when ten thousand people in the
streets of Philadelphia, day after day, threatened to drag Washington out of his house and effect a revolution in the government, or compel it to declare war in favor of the French Revolution and against England. The coolest and the firmest minds, even among the Quakers in Philadelphia, have given their opinions to me that nothing but the yellow fever … could have saved the United States from a total revolution of government. I have no doubt you was fast asleep in philosophical tranquility when
ten thousand people, and perhaps many more, were parading the streets of Philadelphia on the evening of my Fast Day [25 April 1799]; when Governor [Thomas] Mifflin himself thought it his duty to order a patrol of horse and foot to preserve the peace; when Market Street was as full as men could stand by one another, and even before my door; when some of my domestics, in frenzy, determined to sacrifice their lives in my defense; when all were ready to make a desperate sally among the multitude and
others were with difficulty and danger dragged back by the others; when I myself judged it prudent and necessary to order chests of arms from the War Office to be brought through bylanes and back doors, determined to defend my house at the expense of my life and the lives of the few, very few, domestics and friends within it. What think you of terrorism, Mr. Jefferson?"47 Let foes to Freedom dread the name, President Adams had grown increasingly isolated - from his own fellow Federalists who were angered by his decision to seek a
second peace mission to France in 1799 and from Jeffersonians angered by his support of the Alien and Sedition acts. His position was perilous and his personality was fragmenting. The calling of the Legislature will have for its object the choosing of electors by the people in districts; this (as Pennsylvania will do nothing) will ensure a majority of votes in the United States for a Federal candidate. The measure will not fail to be approved by all the Federal party; while it will, no doubt, be condemned by the opposite. As to its intrinsic nature, it is justified by unequivocal reasons of Public Safety. Hamilton's proposal was not so outrageous as it might seem by modern standards. Changing the rules was standard procedure in 1800. Before their New York
victory, Burr's Republicans had wanted to change the state's rules for district elections. Historian Joanne Freeman noted: "There was method to Hamilton's seeming madness. With the Republic's survival at stake, rules and standards had to be bent and adapted, though not overthrown."122 But changing the rules in the middle of the game after the election did seem outrageous - at least to Governor Jay who rejected Hamilton's suggestion by effectively ignoring it. The governor wrote on
Hamilton's letter that is was 'a measure for party purposes wh. I think it wd. not become me to adopt."123 I do, then, with sincere zeal, wish an inviolable preservation of our present Federal Constitution, according to the true sense in which it was adopted by the States, that in which it was advocated by its friends, and not that which its enemies apprehended, who therefore became its enemies; and I am opposed to the monarchising of its features by the forms of its administration, with a view to conciliate a first transition from a President and Senate for life, and from that to an hereditary tenure of these offices, and thus to worm out the elective principle. Churches and newspapers were key campaign tools for both sides. Newspapers were highly partisan and mostly
Federalist, but Jefferson used what periodicals he could to support his campaign and he did so most energetically. He was fortunate that the number of Republican newspapers grew sharply as the election approached.142 Jefferson scholar Jerry W. Knudson noted: "The federalist press did not lose the election; on the contrary, it came remarkably close to winning it."143 The impact of the media, however, would only truly be felt in states like Maryland where the results of the
election had not been effectively predetermined by the rules or other factors. Cliff Sloan and David McKean wrote that Jefferson "would later acknowledge that he personally underwrote the Republican press: 'I as well as most other Republicans who were in the way of doing it, contributed what I could to the support of the republican papers and printers,' including 'sums of money for the Bee, the Albany Register, etc. when they were staggering under the sedition law, contributed to the fines of
Callender himself, of Holt, Brown and others suffering under that law."144 In 1797 rogue journalist James Callender had complained to Jefferson of Federalist persecution. Jefferson began to send him a series of small payments that Jefferson later claimed to be "mere charities."145 Jefferson wrote of one of Callender's articles: "Such papers cannot fail to produce the best effect. They inform the thinking part of the nation."146 Historian Thomas Fleming wrote:
"The journalist was a heavy drinker with a paranoid streak that widened appreciably when he was jailed under the Sedition Act, the law that made it a crime to criticize a president. Jefferson, who believed the law was unconstitutional, gave Callender money and sympathy. When Jefferson became president in 1800, he pardoned the journalist."147 When Jefferson's charity ceased, however, Callender would turn on Jefferson. 'Tis a notable expedient for keeping the Federal party together, to have at the head of it a man, who hates and is despised by those men of it, who, in times past, have been its most efficient supporters. If the cause is to be sacrificed to a weak and perverse man, I withdraw from the party, and act upon my own ground; never, certainly, against my principles, but in pursuance of them in my own way. I am mistaken, if others will not do the same. The only way to prevent a fatal schism is to support General Pinckney in good earnest. If I can be perfectly satisfied, that Adams and Pinckney will be upheld in the East with entire good faith; on the ground of conformity, I will, wherever my influence may extend, pursue the same plan. If not, I will pursue Mr. Pinckney, as my single object. Adieu.154 Historian Joanne B. Freeman has noted that the results of presidential elections were highly dependent on the honor of the candidates' supporters. "Personal honor was the ultimate bond of party when all else failed, the only way to overcome the many conflicting regional and personal claims that tore a man's
commitments of principles. In the absence of the firm partisan bonds that scholars often take for granted on the national stage, honor was a fundamental underpinning of national partisan combat."155 Aaron Burr had experienced in1796 what happened when politicians did not honor their commitments. In so doing, the Virginians had assured that Burr would become wary and calculating with Jefferson. "We understand that, at the close of the late session, the federalists consulted on the measures proper to be taken by the friends of order and true liberty, to keep the chair from being occupied by an enemy of both. This was the principal object, to which all inferior considerations must be made to yield. It was known and allowed that Mr. Adams had conducted strangely and unaccountably, and that his reelection would be very inauspicious to the United States. But, great as that evil appeared, it was thought indispensably necessary to run the risk of it, and to agree fairly to vote for him and General Pinckney, because chance might exclude the former, and because any other arrangement would, by dividing the party, inevitably exclude both, and absolutely secure the success of Mr. Jefferson; and because, also, many, perhaps most, of the federalists will believe, it is better to have him, Mr. Adams, again, than Mr. Jefferson. The question being, not what opinion we must have of the candidates, but what conduct we are to pursue, I do not see cause to arraign the policy of the result of that meeting. For, in the first place, it is manifestly impossible to get votes enough for General P. to prevent the choice of Mr. Jefferson, in case he should be supported in open hostility to Mr. A. The sixteen votes of this State, and four of Rhode Island, may be counted as adhering, in all events, to Mr. A. Then why should we ground any plan of conduct on a known impracticability of its execution? By taking that course of open hostility, generous as it may seem, we are at issue with all the federalists who would not join us, and whose vexation and despair would ascribe the certain ill success of the party to us, and not to the Jacobins. They would say we make Mr. Jefferson President, and the vindictive friends of Mr. A. would join in the accusation. The federalists would be defeated, which is bad, and disjointed and enraged against one another, which would be worse. Now it seems to me, that the great object of duty and prudence is, to keep the party strong, by its union and spirit. For I see almost no chance of preventing the election of Mr. Jefferson. Pennsylvania will be managed eventually by Governor McKean and Governor Dallas, to throw its whole weight into that scale. The question is not, I fear, how we shall fight, but how we and all federalists shall fall, that we may fall, like Antjeus, the stronger for our fall. It is, I confess, awkward and embarrassing, to act under the constraints that we do. But sincerity will do much to extricate us. Where is the inconsistency of saying, President A. has not our approbation of some of his measures, nor do we desire his reelection: but many federalists do, and the only chance to prevent the triumph of the Jacobins, is to unite, and vote according to the compromise made at Philadelphia, for the two candidates. That this gives an equal chance, and a better than we would freely give to one of them. But, strong as our objections are, and strongly as we could, and are willing to, urge them to the public, we refrain, because the effect of urging them would be to split the federalists, and absolutely to insure Mr. Jefferson's success. That, however, if the rancorous - and absurd attacks of Mr. A.'s personal friends, and the meditated intrigues with our legislature, should make it necessary, we shall not fail to prevent the effect of that compromise which they thus abuse, and turn against the avowed design of those who made it; and that we shall not sit still, but resort to such measures as they will render necessary. That this compromise not only exhibits the condescension and pliancy of Mr. A.'s opposers, but is the only good basis of the success of either Mr. A.'s or General P.'s friends in the event, as it engages beforehand for the acquiescence of the disappointed part of the federalists, and also as it is the only step that can unite them to oppose the election of a Jacobin, and, in that sad event, that can keep them united as a party, without whose union, oppression and revolution will ensue."165 Adams was unquestionably injured by the efforts of Hamilton, with whom Adams had repeatedly clashed as president - most recently over the Administration's policy toward
France. The Adams foreign policy eventually bore fruit but word of a new treaty with France reached America after most states had already chosen their electors and after Hamilton created a diatribe against Adam's presidency and personality. The former secretary of the Treasury sometimes committed more to paper than was wise. Ron Chernow wrote: "In writing an intemperate indictment of John Adams, Hamilton committed a form of political suicide that blighted the rest of his career."166
Unquestionably, it was not Hamilton's finest hour. John Ferling wrote that "Hamilton, driven by his hatred of Adams to the point that his customary highly sensitive political skills were subsumed by his irrational passion, decided to publish an open philippic against the president."167 Hamilton had been working on the document during the summer - seeking assistance from past and present members of Adams' cabinet. Naively, Hamilton apparently thought he could privately print and
distribute the 54-page document to Federalist leaders. I hasten to give you some information which may be useful. I know as a fact, that overtures have been made by leading individuals of the Federal party to Burr, who declines to give any assurances respecting his future intentions and conduct, saying, "that to do it might injure him with his friends, and prevent their co-operation; that all ought to be inferred from the necessity of his future situation, as it regarded the disappointment and animosity of the Anti-Federalists; that the Federalists, relying upon this, might proceed in the certainty that, upon a second ballot, New York and Tennessee would join him. Jefferson's association with France was still held against him by most Federalists. Historian John Zvesper wrote that the Federalists worried that "the wild, Jacobinical ideological tendencies that the Republicans had displayed since the French Revolution suggested that all of the achievements of the American Revolution and the constitution making of the 1770s and 1780s would be reversed by them....At its worst, Jefferson and the Republicans would
replicate in the American republic the mobocracy of the French republic and the military dictatorship that grew out of it. The hopes of mankind for all the benefits of liberty rested on America. How could the Federalist party just walk away from the battle?"245 The Federalists's animus toward Jefferson obscured the danger and deficiencies of Burr, but they did not obscure the Federalists' strategy. Because the outgoing Congress would elect the President and because the House was
controlled by Federalists, that party would have had an advantage in the vote where each representative cast one vote. Because their votes were concentrated in a few states in the northeast, the Federalists did not control a majority of the state delegations. The three delegations which were evenly split between Federalists and Republicans could not vote until one of their members abstained or changed his vote. Desperate as some of the adverse party there may be, I can scarcely allow myself to believe that enough will not be found to frustrate the attempt to strangle the election of the people, and smuggle into the Chief Magistracy the choice of a faction. It would seem that every individual member who has any standing or stake in society, or any portion of virtue or sober understanding, must revolt at the tendency of such a manoeuvre. Is it possible that Mr. Adams should give his sanction to it, if that should be made a necessary ingredient? or that he would not hold it his duty or his policy, in case the present House should obstinately refuse to give effect to the Constitution, to appoint, which he certainly may do before his office expires, as early a day as possible after that event for the succeeding House to meet and supply the omission? Should he disappoint a just expectation in either instance, it will be an omen, I think, forbidding the steps towards him which you seem to be meditating.249 Threats and rumors of threats of armed force were exchanged by both sides. Speculation about the actions of others was generally more extreme than
anything the other side actually contemplated, but both sides were prepared to act to prevent the possible depredations of the other. Jefferson himself wrote early in his presidency: "In the event of an usurpation, I was decidedly with those who were determined not to permit it. Because that precedent once set, would be artificially reproduced and end soon in a dictator." In a letter to Pennsylvania Governor Thomas McKean, Jefferson wrote: "Had [the election of 1800] terminated in the elevation
of Mr. Burr, every republican would, I am sure, have acquiesced in a moment; because, however it might have been variant from the intentions of the voters, yet it would have been agreeable to the Constitution."250 "If the tumultuous meetings of a few fighting bacchanals in Virginia mean the people, and are to dictate to the Congress of the United States whom to elect as President - if the constitutional rights of this body are so soon to become the prey of anarchy and faction - if we have already arrived at that disastrous period in the life of nations 'when liberty consists in no longer reverencing either the law or the authorities' - in short the scenes which sadden the history of the elective monarchies of Europe are so soon to be re-acted in America, it would be prudent to prepare at once for the contest: the woeful experiment if tried at all could never be tried at a more favorable conjuncture!"251 Nearly a half century later, Albert Gallatin recalled the Jeffersonians' benign intent: "The only cause of real apprehension was that Congress should adjourn without making a decision, but without usurping any powers. It was in order to provide against that contingency that I prepared myself a plan which did meet with the approbation of our party. No appeal whatever to physical forces was contemplated; nor did it contain a
single particle of revolutionary spirit. In framing this plan, Mr. Jefferson had not been consulted; but it was communicated to him, and he fully approved it." Gallatin recalled that "it was threatened by some persons of the Federal party to provide by law that if no election should take place, the Executive power should be placed in the hands of some public officer. This was considered as a revolutionary act of usurpation, and would, I believe, have been put down by force if necessary. But
there was not the slightest intention or suggestion to call a convention to reorganize the government and to amend the Constitution. That such a measure floated in the mind of Mr. Jefferson is clear from his letters of February 15 and 18, 1801, to Mr. Monroe and Mr. Madison. He may have wished for such measure, or thought that the Federalists might be frightened by the threat."252 James Roger Sharp maintained: "Gallatin's recollection was faulty, as evidenced by [Governor Thomas]
McKean's letter to Jefferson. McKean was prepared to act, not to prevent violence, as Gallatin was to have it, but to assure Jefferson the presidency."253 First, sir, the support of public credit; secondly, the maintenance of the naval system; and lastly, that 'Subordinate public officers employed only in the ' execution of details, established by law, shall not be removed from office on the ground of their political character, nor without complaint against their conduct. I explained myself that I considered it not only reasonable but necessary that offices of high discretion and confidence should be filled by men of Mr, Jefferson's choice. I exemplified by mentioning on the one hand, the offices of the secretaries of states, treasury, foreign ministers, &c. and-on the other, the collectors of ports, S.C. Mr. Nicholas answered me, that he considered the points as very reasonable, that he was satisfied that they corresponded with the views and intentions of Mr. Jefferson, and knew him well. That he was acquainted with most of the gentlemen who would probably be about him and enjoying his confidence, in case he became president, and that if I would be satisfied with his assurance, he could solemnly declare it as his opinion, that Mr. Jefferson, in his administration, would not depart from the points I had proposed. I replied to Mr. Nicholas, that I had not the least doubt of the sincerity of his declaration, and that his opinion was perfectly correct, but that I wanted an engagement, and that if the points could in any form be understood as conceded by Mr. Jefferson, the election should be ended, and proposed to him to consult Mr. Jefferson. This he declined, and said he could do no more than give me the assurance of his own opinion as to the sentiments and designs of Mr. Jefferson and his friends. I told him that was not sufficient, that we should not surrender without better terms. Upon this we separated, and I shortly after met with Genera l Smith, to whom I unfolded myself in the same manner that I had done to Mr. Nicholas. In explaining myself to him in relation to the nature of the offices alluded to, I mentioned the offices of George Latimer, collector of the port of Philadelphia, and Allen M'Lane, collector of Wilmington. General Smith gave me the same assurances as to the observance by Mr. Jefferson of the points which I had stated, which Mr. Nicholas had done. I told him I should not be satisfied nor agree to yield, till I had the assurance from Mr. Jefferson himself; but that if he would consult Mr. Jefferson and bring the assurance from him, the election should be ended. The general made no difficulty in consulting Mr. Jefferson, and proposed giving me his answer the next morning. The next day, upon our meeting, General Smith informed me that he had seen Mr. Jefferson and, stated to him the points mentioned, and was authorized by him to say, that they corresponded with his views and intentions, and that we might confide in him accordingly. The opposition of Vermont, Maryland, and Delaware, was immediately withdrawn, and Mr. Jefferson was made president by the votes of ten states."308 Smith led Bayard astray - perhaps not by outright misrepresentation but certainly by
the appearance of what he represented. Jefferson scholar Susan Dunn described what transpired: Smith "feels Jefferson out on several issues and then reports to Bayard that Jefferson would do nothing to change certain key Federalist policies or remove certain men. Later Smith explains that Jefferson did not have 'the remotest idea of my object' and had no knowledge that Smith was acting as a go-between with Bayard. 'I was satisfied in my own mind that [Jefferson's] conduct...would be so and so,'
Smith writes. "But certainly never did tell [Bayard] that I had any authority from Mr. Jefferson to communicate anything to him.' On February 15, Jefferson gives his own account of the story; he was approached by people wanting to 'obtain terms & promises from me,' he tells Monroe. Would he agree to follow Federalist policies in exchange for their votes? 'I have declared to them unequivocally,' he asserts, that I would not receive the government on capitulation, that I would not go into it
with my hands tied.'"309 After exactly a week's balloting there at length appeared ten States for me, four for Burr, and two voted blanks. This was done without a single vote coming over. Morris of Vermont withdrew, so that Lyon's vote became that of the State. The four Maryland federalists put in blanks, so then the vote of the four republicans became that of their State. Mr. Hager of South Carolina (who had constantly voted for me) withdrew by agreement, his colleagues agreeing in that case to put in blanks. Bayard, the sole member of Delaware, voted blank. They had before deliberated whether they would come over in a body, when they saw they could not force Burr on the republicans, or keep their body entire and unbroken to act in phalanx on such ground of opposition as they shall hereafter be able to conjure up. Their vote showed what they had decided on, and is considered as a declaration of perpetual war; but their conduct has completely left them without support. Our information from all quarters is that the whole body of federalists concurred with the republicans in the last elections, and with equal anxiety. They had been made to interest themselves so warmly for the very choice, which while before the people they opposed, that when obtained it came as a thing of their own wishes, and they find themselves embodied with the republicans, and their quondam leaders separated from them, and I verily believe they will remain embodied with us, so that this conduct of the minority has done in one week what very probably could hardly have been effected by years of mild and impartial administration.312 Jefferson's analysis of the election resolution - contained in a letter to James Madison, seems a curious mixture of bluster and wishful thinking: "The minority in the House of Representatives, after seeing the impossibility of electing Burr, the certainty that a legislative usurpation would be resisted by arms, and a recourse to a convention to reorganize and amend the government, held a consultation on this dilemma, whether it would be better for them to come over in a body and go with the
tide of the times, or by a negative conduct suffer the election to be made by a bare majority, keeping their body entire and unbroken, to act in phalanx on such ground of opposition as circumstances shall offer; and I know their determination on this question only by their vote of yesterday. [Feb. 17.] Morris, of Vermont, withdrew, which made Lyon's vote that of his State. The Maryland federalists put in four blanks, which made the positive ticket of their colleagues the vote of the State. South
Carolina and Delaware put in six blanks. So there were ten States for one candidate, four for another, and two blanks. We consider this, therefore, as a declaration of war, on the part of this band. But their conduct appears to have brought over to us the whole body of federalists, who, being alarmed with the danger of a dissolution of the government, had been made most anxiously to wish the very administration they had opposed, and to view it, when obtained, as a child of their
own."313
Why was Jefferson's election called the Revolution of 1800?In what is sometimes called the "Revolution of 1800", Vice President Thomas Jefferson of the Democratic-Republican Party defeated incumbent president John Adams of the Federalist Party. The election was a political realignment that ushered in a generation of Democratic-Republican leadership.
What did Thomas Jefferson say about the election of 1800?Writing to Judge Spencer Roane in the summer of 1819, Thomas Jefferson recalled the tumultuous events leading up to his election to the presidency nearly two decades earlier. The "revolution of 1800 ... was as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of [17]76.
What was final outcome of the election of 1800 Text to Speech?Thomas Jefferson (Democratic-Republican) defeated John Adams (Federalist) in the presidential election of 1800 by an electoral vote of seventy-three to sixty-five.
Why was the election of 1800 referred to as a peaceful election quizlet?The election of 1800 was significant because it marked the first peaceful transition in power from one political party to another.
|