The act of choosing which issues or topics deserve public discussion.

Abstract

Media ethics is a branch of ethics that addresses moral issues arising in connection with the acquisition, preparation, storage, presentation, dissemination, and reception of information through the means of mass media. Mass media include print media [newspapers, magazines, and books], recordings, motion pictures, and electronic media [radio, television, and the computer]. Media ethics seeks to help the media practitioners resolve various moral problems arising in all the areas of media communications: journalism, advertising, public relations, and entertainment. The media exercise a strong and complex influence upon the perception and understanding of the world by the public and, consequently, upon shaping the personality of each individual and the interactions of individuals with one another. News and reportage, commercials and advertisements, soap operas, and films – all exert in the long run more or less subtle influence on people's views, choices, and behavior. Because of the ubiquity of the media and their growing presence, the ethical problems that the media practitioners face become increasingly important. The number of publications and conferences on media indicates that among the issues that concern the media people and the public the most important are truth in the media [objectivity and fairness], freedom and responsibility [self-regulatory mechanisms], privacy, and the quality of the media content [violence and pornography].

Whither Media Ethics?

Media ethics has largely developed as a field concerned with the practices of professionals, especially the analysis of hard cases that face journalists [deception, disclosure of sources, the blurry borders of objectivity, etc.]. The sheer range and diversity of frameworks reflecting on mass communication and its larger social, political, moral, spiritual, pedagogical, economic, cultural, and aesthetic implications suggest a richer agenda for media ethics. Questions about the tenor of public life, the experience of childhood, the relief of suffering, the possibilities of artistic expression, or the texture of political life in an age of user-generated content, for instance, might take a rightful place in debates about mass communication next to questions about liberty, information, and ideology. Though various normative frameworks may be mutually incompatible in their principles, emphases, or conclusions, each one has something to offer.

VII.C Ethics Instruction

Although the teaching of media ethics was called for in early accreditation guidelines for schools and departments of journalism/mass communication, the emphasis has gotten stronger over the years. Many programs, both accredited and not accredited, make media ethics part of a set of core courses common to all specialization areas. Edmund B. Lambeth, Clifford Christians, and Kyle Cole in an Autumn 1994 article in Journalism Educator reported that they found a 56% increase in the number of separate, freestanding media ethics courses offered by schools, departments, and programs of journalism and mass communication compared to a decade before. Modules on ethics in conceptual and skills courses actually increased almost tenfold.

One explanation for this, of course, is that universities increasingly find it necessary to forge their own credibility with the public at a time when the media industry has lost some trust due to mergers and expansion in entertainment-driven news. Another is that the enhancement of critical skills for practitioners and philosophical thinking about right and wrong are strong selling points for a program trying to solidify its position in the university. Teaching ethics puts the spotlight on journalism's highest calling: pursuit of truth for public service.

Entertainment celebrities have encouraged this ethics trend [consider Carol Burnett's funding of an ethics program for responsible journalism at the University of Hawaii more than a decade ago] as have nonprofit organizations such as The Poynter Institute for Media Studies and The Freedom Forum. Both participate in journalism education that values journalistic integrity and training in excellence.

I Macroethical Issues In Media

The realm of international media ethics is not easily defined, due in part to practical and philosophical relationships between law and ethics; differences in cultural expectations about ethical behavior, etiquette, morals, taste, and aesthetics; and each country's or region's view about the appropriate role of the press.

While law often is based in accepted moral rules of conduct, the focus of media ethics is different from that of media law. Law establishes rules for behavior that must be adhered to on the threat of government or civil sanction or opprobrium. Ethics constrains or inspires behavior by establishing principles and standards that ought to be adhered to because they are the right thing to do.

Laws governing the media vary vastly from country to country, and when the boundaries of media law differ, so do the boundaries of media ethics. For example, a behavior or practice that might be regulated as a matter of law in one country might in another country be left legally unregulated and is thus solely an ethical issue.

One of the most difficult issues faced by all governments is how much freedom to allow communications media, how much to control them, what content to control, and who should make these decisions. There is no media system in the world that is totally free from regulation of some kind; all media systems institute regulations for business practices, news gathering, media content, and a host of other issues. It can only follow, then, that ethical expectations and practices for the media will vary from country to country according to the differences in media laws.

Media ethical standards vary also by cultural expectation and assumption. For example, media content considered to be in poor taste in one culture may not be in poor taste in another; media depictions of appropriate roles and relationships of and between men and women vary considerably among cultures; and definitions of indecency and obscenity widely vary, with nudity seen as shocking and outrageous in some nations while being commonly accepted in others. In journalism, countries and cultures vary in normative expectations about how political figures, people accused of crimes, and juveniles should be covered in the news; similarly, cultural expectations might forbid an adversarial relationship between news media and government in some countries while other cultures might value it.

Countries differ also in their views about the appropriate role of the press within their societies. Cultures that highly value individual rights might assume media should be free to write and depict whatever they choose and that individuals should have no constraints on their media consumption. Cultures that emphasize the collective, on the other hand, might value media that advance societal cooperation, development, education, and growth.

Because legal and cultural standards vary within the international arena, it is difficult to identify or describe international media ethics with unerring precision. The remainder of this article makes some rather broad statements about issues in international media ethics, but there will almost always be variations and exceptions to the generalizations made here.

Media content, or what is written or presented in media, is always a pivotal ethical issue that centers on the question of what ideas and behaviors should be fostered and modeled in public discourse and in popular culture productions. While ethical norms relating to the media may vary, and while practitioners, scholars, and media audiences around the world may disagree as to appropriate media content and practices, certain issues are standard in media ethics concerns, including the following: truthfulness, distortion and deception, conflicts of interest, sensationalism, violence, pornography and indecency, poor taste, stereotyping, exclusion from media of constituent groups of society and their issues [i.e., disenfranchised, poor, aged, ill, disabled, minorities, religious or political extremists], invasion of privacy, misuse of valuable resources [i.e., time, money, space, technology], misappropriation of intellectual or creative property [i.e., plagiarism, copyright and trademark infringement], harmful images and messages, unbridled economic greed, self-interest and careerism at the expense of others, lack of respect for persons, pandering or appealing to base [rather than noble] human instincts [i.e., greed, hatred, lust], media impact on the vulnerable, economic influence on news content, problems arising from media ownership and control, censorship and free expression, propaganda, media obligations to society, and media and government relations.

Each of these macroethical issues for the media is more troublesome in some media contexts than in others. The following discussion addresses some of these ethical issues in news and information, entertainment, advertising and public relations, and the Internet. It then considers consolidation of media ownership, media globalization, and the search in this new and emerging media environment for common universal values that can provide a foundation for media regulation and ethics in the global media environment.

Ethical Foundations of Computer and Information Ethics

The fundamental right to free expression is the normative basis of information and media ethics. The freedom of information sharing and the freedom of media are complementary to each other and their justification has the same origin. Beginning in Ancient Greece and leading up to the end of the twentieth century, information and media ethics were founded on two ideas: the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. Now, with the advent of a networked world of electronic information, another element has gained in importance: the freedom of access. The practical application of civil rights and liberties is concerned with individual freedom of expression [self-realization], on the one hand, and political autonomy within the state [participation], on the other hand. Consequently, media and information freedom is an articulation of both the individual civil rights as a principle of human dignity and the democratic principle.

Information and computer ethics draw on – besides freedom as value – a broad spectrum of values. Approaches relating to theories of the good life request a value-oriented integration of IT in society and in individual life. The political concept of a sustainable information society defines criteria such as health, security, environmental compatibility, education and knowledge, opportunities, or cultural and personal identity as essential requirements for humanly created technological progress.

Different from information ethics, the fundamentals of computer ethics are more strongly grounded in the field of technological and professional ethics. It relates, on the one hand, to the computer as a technical artifact with specific morally relevant effects and, on the other hand, to the responsible activity of computing professionals. In this sense, there are a number of ethical codes that stem from the different national associations as a guide for the professional activities of individuals. For example, the code of ethics of the U.S. Association for Computing Machinery states, “When designing or implementing systems, computing professionals must attempt to ensure that the products of their efforts will be used in socially responsible ways, will meet social needs, and will avoid harmful effects to health and welfare.” Even if there are different emphases placed on different fields in computer ethics and information ethics, an ethical reflection of systems that deal with information is necessarily always linked to both fields, which although they are analytically separate cannot be distinguished in practice.

VIII.A A Journalistic Culture

It was noted earlier that strong pressures exerted on the American press during the 1920s sought to shape ethical behavior through self-regulation with a touch of coercive threat, very similar to what has turned out to be the dominant European model for media ethics. Organizations were encouraged to draft ethics codes with enforcement provisions so that journalism might join law and medicine as professions.

Furthermore, of course, educational institutions either created or formalized many of the orthodoxies of journalism that, while teaching students how the First Amendment protected a free press, nevertheless instructed generations of students in rule-following traditions of journalism, creating a shared newsroom culture in which journalists tended toward similar views such that one newspaper or one television or radio newscast was very much like another in content and approaches to public matters. A list of values [e.g., timeliness, consequence, prominence] instructed students on how to determine whether an event was newsworthy, and common values emerged regarding the naming of suicide victims or youthful offenders and in the identification of persons arrested, but not yet convicted, for crimes [in contrast to much European practice].

Many journalists accepted the admonition to take care not to conduct the trial by press in court coverage that would deny defendants rights to fair trials, a convention that magnified the power of judges to control news content on judicial matters. Always attribute sources, students were told, but keep promises of confidentiality to sources and avoid involvement in community affairs. These and other teachings made many newsroom policies not only predictable but also closed to discussion.

Journalism students even learned to evaluate which newspapers were of high quality and which were not, according to their adherence to a list of criteria for a superior newspaper. These practices were neither good nor bad on their face, but they did suggest that the shared values did not promote the autonomy and independent action protected by the First Amendment.

The extension for some was that the codes, both formal and informal, that resulted from this culture would be sufficiently strong that those who transgressed would submit to punishment for violating professional standards. Such a course was, if the literature of the day is to be believed, the overwhelming favorite pathway to making journalism one of the professions, bringing prestige and avoiding restrictive laws at the hands of legislators outraged by journalistic excesses.

The experience of the ASNE and the 1931 court decision on prior restraint sapped the enforcement energy of codes and rendered efforts at self-regulation ineffective, while aspirations for joining the professions drifted in the wind. Still, many [including journalists] did not understand the profound braking effect of these actions on the self-regulation movement as they sought other ways in which to bring an order to journalistic behavior.

The overwhelming ethical instruction to both journalists and journalism students through the 1960s involved the use of anecdotes to illustrate the correct, as well as the erroneous, ways of practicing journalism, with little reference to principles or to function. Typical of this attitude is the Pulitzer Prize-winning editor who in 1999, when offered an opportunity to validate in detail the reasons why his paper published a controversial story, replied that it satisfied requirements of newsworthiness—his view of an adequate justification.

And there matters rested, with the Commission on Freedom of the Press reports producing a slight spike on the screen of journalistic conduct during the late 1940s and the 1950s, but little was done about journalistic ethics until the early 1970s and the lengthy Watergate episode that led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon in 1974.

Recommended Resources

For more information on ethics and research guidelines within the U.S. context, visit the Department of Health and Human Services Web site. This Web site offers an international compilation of human research standards [hhs.gov/ohrp/international/intlcompilation/intlcompilation.html]. Notably, these conversations continue to change and grow. The information and data sharing capacities of the Internet have broadened discussions among a range of scientific and regulatory communities. The AOIR documents some of these discussions on their ethics wiki at ethics.aoir.org.

For more information on philosophical discussions of ethics within technological contexts or computing, see Buchanan's edited collection on virtual ethics [2004]; Ess's work on Digital Media Ethics [2009]; Moor's discussions of Cyberethics [2007]; or Tavani's edited volume on Ethics and Technology [2013].

For more information on process-based models of ethical decision-making practices in digital contexts, see the AOIR ethics documents [2002, 2012]; McKee and Porter's work on casuistic or case-based ethics [2009]; Markham's discussions of ethics as method [2006]; Wyatt's work on ethics in e-research [2011]; or Nissenbaum's discussions of contextual integrity [2012].

For general overviews of Internet research ethics, see the AOIR ethics wiki, which links to the AOIR Ethics Committee guidelines as well as other resources. For an extensive review of key issues, see the entry by the same name in Stanford University's Encyclopedia of Philosophy: //plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-internet-research/.

Intellectual property, copyright, and fair use are important ethical topics that were not addressed in this article. Copyright bridges legal and ethical realms. Conceptualizations, regulations, and laws vary by country. This is an important consideration in Internet research. Copyright and intellectual property may be a more relevant concern than the issue of human subjects in certain disciplines – i.e., linguistics. To get more information about these debates and best practices, see American University's Center for Media and Social Impact Web site, which contains an extensive section on fair use of copyrighted materials. For more information on copyright law by country, see //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Copyright_law_by_country.

Ethical Theory and Philosophy

Just as philosophy is subdivided into practical, theoretical, and natural philosophy, moral philosophy itself is divided into theoretical and applied moral philosophy. Applied ethics, or applied moral philosophy, deals with specific areas of human concern and activity that entail and raise their own specific ethical and moral quandaries. Examples of applied ethics are business, medical, environmental, sexual, and computer ethics, as well as legal, political, military, media ethics, and bioethics. Interestingly, “just war theory” falls under the category of applied ethics. Yet, it has been argued that the transformation of war in the 20th century and the way it affects human existence is so dramatic and pervasive that the decision to when and under what conditions engagement in war is justified belongs to the realm of theoretical philosophy itself and is not just an application of a particular set of moral principles. This, however, is also true of the other forms of applied ethics. Computer ethics and medical ethics, for instance, are not simply the application of a series of ethical principles to the world of computers and medicine. Rather, computer and medical ethics raise profound and challenging questions about the nature and character of moral agents and the limits of moral responsibility. Theoretical moral philosophy itself is subdivided into meta-ethics and normative ethics. Meta-ethics focuses on the status of moral claims, whether these claims can be known and judged rationally, and how human agents acquire the cognitive competence to both recognize and judge ethical statements. Meta-ethics, therefore, deals with moral psychology and epistemology and of course with the general question of whether morality itself admits to a nonsubjective and nonindividualist existence and whether moral principles have an existence independent from the autonomous will of persons. While meta-ethics focuses on the possibility of morals in general, normative ethics focuses on how to achieve the morally good life, that is, the general principles that one should follow in order to achieve a morally righteous life. A lot of work in moral theory falls under one of these three very general rubrics. Yet, this way of presenting a taxonomy of work on moral theory is applied retrospectively and from the standpoint of what philosophers themselves claim are contingent disciplinary boundaries.

Another way of looking at work in moral theory is to offer a typology of moral theories in terms of where they focus their philosophical attention. Moral questions concern questions of what can, could have been, and should have been done by someone in order to achieve a specific goal or aim. Like most human action and behavior, ethical acts involved a subject or agent, who decides to do something in a particular way in order to achieve a particular aim or goal. There is an agent, a way of doing something, and then there is the aim. Some moral theories have focused on the moral agent or actor, because they assume that the how and the aim are unimportant to the overall moral character of the act. If an agent or actor is moral, virtuous, caring, and generous, then their acts are bound to be moral and the result of their acts will be moral. Virtue ethics, natural law, emotivism, and feminist care ethics are some examples of moral theories that focus on moral agents. Other moral theories have focused instead on the end or goal and thus argue on the criteria of evaluating the moral worth of an act by how its result enhances or increases a particular moral good. Theories that focus on ends and goals are generally known as consequentialist. Utilitarianism, as well as hedonism, is a form of consequentialism. For this type of theories, the moral character of the actor is bracketed or suspended. What is important is if a particular act or norm increases a certain social good and decreases a certain social ailment. Yet another group of theories focuses on neither actors nor ends, but rather on the character of the act itself, that is, on the maxim or rule that may be derived from following this particular act. Moral theories that opt for this approach are forms of moral absolutism and are sometimes known by the name of deontology. Kant's moral philosophy is an example of deontology.

Ethical Theory and Philosophy

Just as philosophy is subdivided into practical, theoretical, and natural philosophy, moral philosophy itself is divided into theoretical and applied moral philosophy. Applied ethics, or applied moral philosophy, deals with specific areas of human concern and activity that entail and raise their own specific ethical and moral quandaries. Examples of applied ethics are: business, medical, environmental, sexual, and computer ethics, as well as legal, political, military, media ethics, and bioethics. Interestingly, ‘just war theory’, falls under the category of applied ethics. Yet, it has been argued that the transformation of war in the twentieth century, and the way it affects human existence is so dramatic and pervasive that the decision to when and under what conditions engagement in war is justified belongs to the realm of theoretical philosophy itself, and is not just an application of a particular set of moral principles. This, however, is also true of the other forms of applied ethics. Computer ethics and medical ethics, for instance, are not simply the application of a series of ethical principles to the world of computers and medicine. Rather, computer and medical ethics raise profound and challenging questions about the nature and character of moral agents and the limits of moral responsibility. Theoretical moral philosophy itself is subdivided into meta-ethics and normative ethics. Meta-ethics focuses on the status of moral claims, whether these claims can be known and judged rationally, and how human agents acquire the cognitive competence to both recognize and judge ethical statements. Meta-ethics, therefore deals with moral psychology and epistemology, and of course with the general question of whether morality itself admits to a nonsubjective and nonindividualist existence, and, whether moral principles have an existence independent from the autonomous will of persons. While meta-ethics focuses on the possibility of morals in general, normative ethics focuses on how to achieve the morally good life, that is, the general principles that one should follow in order to achieve a morally righteous life. A lot of work in moral theory falls under one of these three very general rubrics. Yet, this way of presenting a taxonomy of work on moral theory is applied retrospectively, and from the standpoint of what philosophers themselves claim are contingent disciplinary boundaries.

Another way of looking at work in moral theory is to offer a typology of moral theories in terms of where they focus their philosophical attention. Moral questions concern questions of what can, could have been, and should have been done by someone in order to achieve a specific goal or aim. Like most human action and behavior, ethical acts involved a subject or agent, who decides to do something in a particular way in order to achieve a particular aim or goal. There is an agent, a way of doing something, and then there is the aim. Some moral theories have focused on the moral agent or actor, because they assume that the how and the aim are unimportant to the overall moral character of the act. If an agent or actor is moral, virtuous, caring, and generous then their acts are bound to be moral and the result of their acts will be moral. Virtue ethics, natural law, emotivism, and feminist care ethics are some examples of moral theories that focus on moral agents. Other moral theories have focused instead on the end or goal, and thus argue on the criteria of evaluating the moral worth of an act by how its result enhances or increases a particular moral good. Theories that focus on ends and goals are generally known as consequentialist. Utilitarianism, as well as hedonism, is a form of consequentialism. For this type of theories the moral character of the actor is bracketed or suspended. What is important is if a particular act or norm increases a certain social good and decreases a certain social ailment. Yet another group of theories focuses on neither actors nor ends, but rather on the character of the act itself, that is, on the maxim or rule that may be derived from following this particular act. Moral theories that opt for this approach are forms of moral absolutism and are sometimes known by the name of deontology. Kant’s moral philosophy is an example of deontology.

Part 4: Future innovations, disruptions, and challenges [to street humanity]

With the rise of roboticized autonomous vehicles [AVs] and Mobility as a Service [MaaS] we are at an important inflection point in the face of perhaps one of the greatest transformational forces to our transport and urban form since the emergence of the private automobile over a hundred years ago.

If increases in driving rates continue [as has been seen with the rise of ride-hailing companies] and household car ownership remains as they are, there will be more cars driving more miles each year—likely worsening congestion and degrading street livability. Struggling transit lines could become more challenged, while bus, taxi, and truck drivers could all see work opportunities radically change, or disappear altogether. AVs will likely call for more frequent curbside access for pickups and drop-offs, and the potential for more free-flowing intersections could create challenges for how these autonomous vehicles interact with cyclists and pedestrians.

On the flip side, vehicles programmed to yield to human travelers could be rendered inoperable at the flick of a hand in populated urban areas, which could lead to a new era of pedestrian and bicyclist criminalization. At the time of this writing, a few opinions were being voiced that to make AVs work there will need to be things like pedestrian gates at corners and other controls on people’s ability to freely cross the street—but this time the crime of “jaywalking” could be enforced by a multitude of cars equipped with a “synopticon” of cameras, fueling fears of AVs becoming tools for authoritarianism. All this speaks to the need to examine the human and machine interfaces—developing systems, policies, and even media ethics, to foster cultural and behavioral norms in support of people’s rights to experience the street ecology without diminishing key senses of humanity. At a basic level this includes feelings of safety and comfort, and at a higher level, feelings around dignity, empowerment, fit and control.n

Many questions remain as to the possible impacts this new technological tidal wave will have on the experiences of those outside the protected confines of driverless cars. Issues of livability, safety, and health will certainly be put to the test—moderating speeds, vehicular size, and behavior will be key in determining outcomes. But we also need to ask how will these streets really feel? Will we—can we—be lifted up in spirit in the presence of driverless vehicular operation? Or will the incessant, droning, uniform, and predictable, driver-less movement undermine our sense of what it means to be human? If this new wave of driverless cars are large, fast, and everywhere, there is little doubt that our sense of the street—our senses of the essence of what it feels to be human, could be deadened—these conflicts, power imbalances, promises, and challenges to our humanity are key questions we deal with in these pages.

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